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Food securityThe debate over whether to provide food-assistance and the form that this assistance should take has a long
history in economics. Despite the ongoing debate, little rigorous evidence exists that compares food-assistance
in the form of cash versus in-kind. This paper uses a randomized evaluation to assess the impacts and cost-
effectiveness of cash, food vouchers, and food transfers. We ﬁnd that all three modalities signiﬁcantly improve
the quantity and quality of food consumed. However, differences emerge in the types of food consumed with
food transfers leading to signiﬁcantly larger increases in calories consumed and vouchers leading to signiﬁcantly
larger increases in dietary-diversity.
© 2013 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.1. Introduction
Certain design issues are common to all social transfer interventions:
who should receive beneﬁts; howmuch should be given andwith what
frequency; how long should beneﬁts be provided; what form of assis-
tance should be provided;what conditions should be attached;whether
the intervention is incentive compatiblewith thebehaviors or outcomes
that are the objective of the program; and the cost-effectiveness of dif-
ferent design options. Analysis of these issues has a long history within
economics. They appear in Senior's (1834) report on the operation of
the Poor Laws in nineteenth century England, in the functioning of the
Famine Codes in late nineteenth century and early twentieth century
India (Drèze, 1990), in discussions surrounding welfare reform in the
United States in the 1990s (Blank, 2002), and in contemporary debates
regarding the design and implementation of social protection programs
in developing countries (Grosh et al., 2008). The form of assistance –, j.hoddinott@cgiar.org
), a.margolies@cgiar.org
ira).
. Open access under CC BY-NC-ND lcash, near-cash transfers such as vouchers, or in-kind – has been espe-
cially contested.
Assistance in the form of cash is justiﬁed primarily on the grounds
that it generates the largest welfare gains because it allows beneﬁciaries
to use the transfers as they see ﬁt. As Glaeser (2012) notes, “I am grateful
for the freedom I enjoy when spending my earnings; surely, aid recipi-
ents also like autonomy. They can choose the spending that best ﬁts
their needs if they are given unrestricted income.”Under the second the-
orem of welfare economics, given certain assumptions, lump-sum cash
transfers are efﬁcient in that they move the economy from one pareto
optimum to another without introducing welfare-destroying distortions
(Blackorby and Donaldson, 1988; Currie and Gahvari, 2008). Moreover,
it is argued that less stigma is attached to cash transfers, which, com-
pared with in-kind or near-cash transfers such as vouchers or food
stamps, are less visible to non-beneﬁciaries (Grosh et al., 2008). After
the necessary administrative structures are in place, cash transfers are
also perceived to be less costly to administer. Jacoby (1997) argues
that in-kind transfers are associated with a large deadweight loss due
to substantially lower beneﬁts relative to the cost of providing it.
Two arguments are made to justify near-cash transfers such as food
stamps and in-kind transfers. The ﬁrst relates to targeting. Where it is
not possible or very costly to identify beneﬁciaries, in-kind transfers
are advantageous because only those truly in need will take-up these
in-kind beneﬁts, and consequently, in-kind transfers may be less
distortionary than cash transfers (Blackorby and Donaldson, 1988;
Currie and Gahvari, 2008; Drèze, 1990). Bruce and Waldman (1991)icense.
1 In 2010 the population of the two urban cantons where the study took place –Lago
Agrio and Tulcan –was 91,744 and 86,498 respectively. The total number of beneﬁciaries
across the two cantonswas 3642. Thus, approximately 2% of the population experienced a
10% increase in income, which we conjecture had little impact on prices.
2 Barrios are existing administrative units within the urban centers with oversight over
social services and other administrative functions.
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Dilemma, in-kind transfers are more efﬁcient than cash transfers even
under conditions of perfect information. The second argument for in-
kind transfers is essentially paternalistic. Policy makers and program
implementers seek to change a particular behavior or the consumption
of a particular good (Currie and Gahvari, 2008). Underpinning this mo-
tive is an assumption that in-kind transfers do not crowd out private
spending on the good being provided.
Other arguments in favor of one form of transfer over another are
circumstance dependent (Coate, 1989). For example, although cash
transfers are preferable when prices are declining, beneﬁciaries are
protected from price increases when they receive in-kind transfers. The
provision of cash transfers can also adversely affect non-beneﬁciaries
living in the same locality when food markets are not integrated be-
cause the injection of cash may cause food prices to rise (Basu, 1996;
Gentilini, 2007).
In the United States over the past 40 years in-kind programs have
been growing faster than cash programs (Glaeser, 2012). Rather than
debating which type of assistance is most effective, the debate usually
centers on the effectiveness of a speciﬁc program such as the Supple-
mental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP, formerly known as the
Food Stamp Program). Only a handful of studies in the United States
compare different policy options for food assistance. One such study
compares food stamps to equivalent cash transfers and ﬁnds that food
stamp beneﬁciaries spend a greater fraction of their transfers on food,
a result commonly referred to as the cash-out puzzle (Fraker et al.,
1995). However, using variation in the roll-out of the food stamp pro-
gram across counties, Hoynes and Schanzenbach (2009) ﬁnd that the
marginal propensity to consume food out of the food stamp is similar
to the marginal propensity of cash. Another recent study compares the
less restricted SNAP program to the more restricted Women, Infants,
and Children (WIC) program and ﬁnds that WIC leads to greater nutri-
tional impacts, especially among children (Yen, 2010).
In developing country contexts, the merits of cash transfers rather
than near-cash or in-kind transfers, particularly food, have produced a
debate that Devereux (2006) describes as polarized and acrimonious.
There are concerns regarding the cost-effectiveness of alternative trans-
fer modalities, a belief that in-kind transfers have especially pernicious
disincentive effects and the impression that in-kind recipients often
sell a portion of their transfers at prices below theirmarket value, there-
by reducing their value. This debate, however, has been hobbled by a
lack of rigorous evidence. Numerous studies exist on the impact of
cash transfers (for review see Fiszbein et al. (2009)) and food transfers
(for review see Barrett andMaxwell (2005) andMargolies andHoddinott
(2012)), but comparisons of impact are often confounded by differences
in program design, the magnitude of the transfer, and the frequency of
the transfer.
In randomized studies of programs in Sri Lanka andMexico impacts of
cash and food transfers are compared and although food is inframarginal
in both programs, in Sri Lanka food leads to smaller impacts on total food
expenditures, while in Mexico food and cash lead to similar impacts
(Cunha, 2012; Sharma, 2006; Skouﬁas et al., 2008). Differences in the de-
sign of cash and food transferswithin and across countries however could
explain results. In Sri Lanka cash transferswere providedbi-weekly over a
three month period whereas food was provided twice, and in southern
Mexico the food transfer was worth 33% more than the cash transfer at
local market prices. In a randomized study in the Democratic Republic
of Congo, cash and coupons are compared and found to have similar
impact on total food expenditures (Aker, 2013). However, similar to
the studies in Mexico and Sri Lanka, differences across cash and coupons
(or food in the case of Mexico and Sri Lanka) emergewith respect to con-
sumption of certain food items.
To our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst study that directly compares three
different types of food assistance side by side, and thus contributes to
the existing literature. It uses a randomized design to compare the im-
pact and cost-effectiveness of cash, food vouchers, and food transferson the quantity and quality of food consumed. To reduce the probability
that impact estimates are confounded by differences in program design,
careful attention was paid to ensure that all aspects of the transfer
program – transfer levels, transfer frequency, and conditions and nutri-
tion messages attached to program participation –were as similar as
possible acrossmodalities. Moreover, the programwas ﬁelded in sever-
al urban and peri-urban localities in Ecuadorwithwell-functioning food
markets. Together with the fact that the intervention was small relative
to the size of the local economy, means that results are not confounded
by differences in price trajectories faced by beneﬁciaries receiving dif-
ferent transfer modalities.1
We ﬁnd that all three treatment arms signiﬁcantly improve the
quantity and quality of food consumed as measured by the value of
per capita food consumption, per capita caloric intake, and dietary di-
versity measures. However, across treatment arms differences emerge
in the types of food consumed with food transfers leading to a signiﬁ-
cantly larger increase in calories consumed, and vouchers leading to a
signiﬁcantly larger improvement in dietary diversity. Combining impact
estimates with costing data, we ﬁnd that in this setting – urban with
well-functioning food markets –given the signiﬁcantly higher costs of
implementing food transfers, food is always the least cost-effective mo-
dality for improving any outcome measure, and vouchers are usually
the most cost-effective.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 introduces
the program and study design; Section 3 presents the data and de-
scriptive analysis; Section 4 discusses the empirical methods used
to evaluate the different transfer modalities; Section 5 presents the
impact results; Section 6 conducts robustness checks and extended
analysis; Section 7 presents the costing and cost-effectiveness analysis;
Section 8 discusses beneﬁciaries preferences and costs; and Section 9
concludes.
2. Program design
2.1. Intervention
Responding to a request from the government of Ecuador in April
2011, theWorld Food Programme (WFP) expanded its assistance to ad-
dress the food security and nutrition needs of Colombian refugees and
to support their integration into Ecuadorian communities. The newpro-
gram was designed as a prospective randomized control trial and
consisted of six monthly transfers of cash, food vouchers, or food to
Colombian refugees and poor Ecuadorian households. The objectives
of the program were three-fold: 1) to improve food consumption by
facilitating access to more nutritious foods, 2) to increase the role of
women in household decision-making related to food consumption, and
3) to reduce tensions between Colombian refugees and host Ecuadorian
populations.
The program was implemented in seven urban centers in the prov-
inces of Carchi and Sucumbíos. Both Carchi and Sucumbíos are northern
border provinces that receive high inﬂuxes of Colombian refugees and
cross-border trafﬁc. However, Carchi is located in the northern high-
lands and Sucumbíos is located in the Amazonian lowlands, and there-
fore, each has distinct cultural, socio-economic and geographic features.
Barrios (or neighborhoods)2within these urban centerswere chosen for
the intervention by WFP in consultation with the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) as areas that had large numbers
of Colombian refugees and relatively high levels of poverty. Each house-
hold in the selected barrios was visited, mapped, and administered a
one-page questionnaire that consisted of basic demographic and
5 Out of 8 items intended tomeasure nutrition knowledge (for example, food sources of
vitamin A or iron) only 1 showed signiﬁcantly different impacts across modalities.
6 One unexpected complication in the study design was the change in beneﬁciary
criteria implemented during the baseline survey data collection. In the process of survey-
ing households, it was concluded that the targeting for the transfers was too broad,
resulting in the inclusion of households who were relatively well off. This led to a re-
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proxy means test to deﬁne program eligibility. However, based on
point scores by nationality, the decision was made to automatically en-
roll all Colombian and mixed-nationality households. In addition, all
households who reported receiving the government's social safety net
transfer program, the Bono de Desarrollo Humano(BDH) were automat-
ically excluded from eligibility. Households residing in the selected bar-
rios with low socioeconomic status as measured by the proxy means
test that met the criteria described above were eligible to participate
in the program.
During enrollment and sensitization, the programwasdescribed as a
poverty and food security transfer targeted toward women, and there-
fore, the majority of the entitlement cardholders were expected to be
women. However, based on household demographics (for example, if
there was no adult woman available), men could also be entitlement
holders and participate in all program activities. Overall, approximately
79% of cardholders in Carchi and 73% of cardholders in Sucumbíos were
women (WFP-Ecuador, 2011).
Participating households received beneﬁts from May 2011 to Octo-
ber 2011.3 The value of the monthly transfer was standardized across
all treatment arms at US$40 per month per household. The transfer
size for all modalities was set to be roughly comparable to the national
cash transfer scheme, the BDH, which at the time of program design,
was US$35 per month per household. For the cash treatment arm, the
$40 was transferred monthly onto pre-programmed ATM cards. Cash
transfer households were able to retrieve the cash at any time after it
had been transferred onto the card; however, it had to be taken out in
bundles of $10. The food vouchers were also valued at $40 and
given in denominations of $20, redeemable for a list of nutritionally-
approved foods at central supermarkets in each urban center. The list
of approved foods consisted of cereals, tubers, fruits, vegetables, le-
gumes, meats, ﬁsh, milk products, and eggs. The food vouchers could
be used over a series of two visits per month and had to be redeemed
within 30 days of initial receipt of the voucher. The vouchers were seri-
alized and printed centrally, andwere non-transferable. The food trans-
fer was valued according to regional market prices at $40 and included
rice (24 kg), vegetable oil (4 l), lentils (8 kg), and canned sardines
(8 cans of 0.425 kg). Although $40 was less than the majority of
household's total monthly food consumption at baseline, the quantity
of food received for each itemwas higher thanwhat themedian house-
hold in our sample consumed at baseline, which suggests that for many
households the items from the food transfer will be extra-marginal.4
Nutrition sensitization was a key component of the program, aimed
at inﬂuencing behavior change and increasing knowledge of recipient
households, especially in regard to dietary diversity. To ensure a consis-
tent approach to knowledge transfer, a curriculum was developed by
WFP to be covered during eachmonthly training session. Topics includ-
ed (1) program sensitization and information, (2) family nutrition,
(3) food and nutrition for pregnant and lactating women, (4) nutri-
tion for children ages 0–12 months, and (5) nutrition for children
ages 12–24 months. All participants regardless of transfer modality
participated in this training, and transfers were conditional on atten-
dance. In addition to monthly meetings, posters and ﬂyers on nutrition
were developed and posted at distribution sites, including supermar-
kets, banks, food warehouses, and community centers, to further
expose participants across all three modalities to messaging. Flyers
covered topics such as recommended food groups, daily nutritional re-
quirements, proper sanitation, and food preparation processes. An
example of aWFP poster is included in the Appendix (Fig. A.1). Empha-
sis throughout the messaging and trainings was placed on foods that
prevent iron, vitamin A, calcium, and iodine deﬁciencies, and on the3 First distribution occurred at the end of April/early May, and last distribution in early
October 2011.
4 At baseline themedian household consumed 21.5 kg of cereals, .13 kg of ﬁsh and sea-
food, and 1.97 kg of pulses and legumes.importance of eating a wide range of food groups in order to maximize
the absorbency of different micronutrients.
Particular attention was given to ensure that beneﬁciaries' experi-
ences with the program would be similar across modalities, and de-
scriptive results indicate that this goal was achieved. In particular,
across all modalities beneﬁciaries reported extremely high rates of sat-
isfaction with both the program and program transparency, believed
that the programwas fair, and reported that program employees treat-
ed themwith respect. On average, 99% of beneﬁciaries reported receiv-
ing their transfers in totality and 97% reported that they received all
information needed to understand how the program worked. Across
the three modalities, a minimum of 88% of beneﬁciaries stated that
they received their scheduled payments on time and that they knew
how many transfers they would receive. Knowledge gained from the
nutrition sensitization sessions, as measured by a set of questions at
baseline and follow-up, was also similar across modalities.5
Beneﬁciarieswere also asked about how they used their most recent
transfer. Voucher households reported using 98.8% on food consump-
tion, compared to 83% for cash households and 63.2% for food house-
holds. Cash households reported that the remainder was spent on
nonfood expenditures (6.3%), sharedwith others outside the household
(2.4%), and saved for later use (8.3%). Food households reported that the
remainder was saved for later use (29.4%) and shared with others out-
side the household (6.8%). Less than 1% of voucher and food beneﬁcia-
ries reported selling their food or voucher.2.2. Study design
The program evaluation was based on random assignment. Ran-
domizationwas conducted in two stages:ﬁrst, barrioswere randomized
to either the treatment groupor the control group; second, all treatment
clusters (geographical units within barrios) were randomized to cash,
food voucher, or food transfer. Because the geographic area in each
urban center was relatively small, this measure was taken to avoid hav-
ing a cluster assigned to the control group within the same barrio as a
cluster assigned to the treatment group and consequently causing
discontent among potential beneﬁciaries. Due to the distinct socioeco-
nomic and geographic characteristics of Sucumbíos and Carchi, the ran-
domization of cluster centers was stratiﬁed at the province level. The
number of clusters per barrio varied from one to six, with an average
of approximately two per barrio. The barrios and clusters were random-
ized into the four treatment arms using percentages of 20/20 for the
control and food arms, and 30/30 for the cash and food voucher arms.6
In total 80 barrios and 145 clusters were randomized into the four inter-
vention arms —control, cash, vouchers and food.3. Data
The baseline survey was conducted in March–April 2011 before the
ﬁrst transfers were distributed. The follow-up survey was conducted
approximately seven months later (October–November 2011) after
the last of the six transfer distributions. The baseline sample for the eval-
uation consists of 2357 households of whom 2122 were re-surveyed attargeting process where households who were relatively well off were dropped from
the program. Since there were not enough households in existing barrios to replace those
that had been excluded and still reach programenrollment targets, the decisionwasmade
to expand coverage to additional barrios on the outer circle of urban areas. These areas
were subsequently re-randomized into treatment arms according to the approximate per-
centage lost.
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data at baseline and follow-up.
Household-level baseline and follow-up questionnaires include de-
tailed information on household food andnon-food expenditures, in ad-
dition to information on demographics, assets, nutrition knowledge,
transfers in and out of household, education, labor, health, discrimina-
tion, and decision-making. The follow-up questionnaire also includes a
section on a household's experience with the transfers. Using informa-
tion from the food and non-food expenditure modules we create mea-
sures of household food and non-food consumption, dietary diversity,
and caloric intake.
3.1. Outcome indicators
Household food consumption aggregates are constructed from the
value of food eaten in the home and the value of food eaten outside
the home in the last seven days. Food eaten in the home is composed
of 407 different food items consumed from not only from food pur-
chased in the marketplace but also food produced at home, food re-
ceived as gifts or remittances from other households or institutions,
and food received as payments for in-kind services. Median prices
from food purchased are used to calculate the total value of food con-
sumed from home production or received as gifts or in-kind payments.
Weekly household values of food consumed are converted to monthly
values, which are then converted to household per capita values by di-
viding by the number of household members. Although we use per
capita values, our results are robust to using adult equivalent values.8
Caloric intake is constructed from the amount of food consumed
in the home (from purchases, own stock, or in kind payments). Speciﬁ-
cally, the amount of food consumed for each item is multiplied by
the energy value for that item to obtain the kilocalories consumed.
Energy values are taken from theNutrition Database for Standard Refer-
ence (USDA, 2010) and from the Tabla de Composicion de Alimentos de
Centroamerica (Manchu and Mendez, 2007). Total weekly household
caloric values are then converted to daily amounts and divided
by household size to obtain caloric intake per person per day. In
some speciﬁcations, we also use adult equivalent values of caloric
intake.
Food consumption and caloric intake play important roles in meeting
food security needs. However, households do not solely value quantity—
a more varied diet is also important. Increased dietary diversity is associ-
ated with a number of improved outcomes in areas such as birth weight,
child anthropometrics, hemoglobin concentrations, hypertension, cardio-
vascular disease, and cancer (Hoddinott and Yohannes, 2002). We con-
struct three separate measures for dietary quality: the Dietary Diversity
Index (DDI), Household Dietary Diversity Score (HDDS), and the Food
Consumption Score (FCS). The most straightforward of these measures,
the Dietary Diversity Index, sums the number of distinct food items con-
sumed by the household in the previous sevendays. The household ques-
tionnaire covers 40 such food items, and thus theDDI ranges from1 to 40.
Hoddinott and Yohannes (2002) show that the DDI correlates well with
both household dietary quantity and quality, and therefore, it provides
a useful summary point of comparison within the measured sample.
The HDDS captures a similar element of food access, although it differs
fromDDI in that frequency is measured across standardized food groups,
instead of individual food items. The score is calculated by summing the
number of food groups consumed in the previous seven days from the
following 12 groups (Kennedy et al., 2011): cereals, roots/tubers, vegeta-
bles, fruits, meat/poultry/offal, eggs, ﬁsh/seafood, pulses/legumes/nuts,
milk/milk products, oils/fats, sugar/honey, miscellaneous. Lastly, WFP
measures food insecurity using a proxy indicator called the food7 The food consumption module included tobacco products; however, we include to-
bacco in the non-food consumption aggregate and not the food consumption aggregate.
8 Adult equivalent values are calculated using the following formula: AE = (A + ∝K)θ
where∝ = .5 and θ = .9 (Deaton and Zaidi, 2002).consumption score (FCS). The FCS is calculated by summing the number
of days that the household consumed the corresponding food group
(staples, pulses, vegetables, fruit, meat and ﬁsh, milk and dairy, sugar
and honey, oils and fats), multiplying the number of days by the food
group's weighted frequencies, and summing across categories to obtain
a single proxy indicator. Households are then categorized as having
poor to borderline consumption if their FCS score is less than or equal
to 35 (WFP, 2008). The FCS has been found to correlatewellwith caloric
availability at the household level (Wiesmann et al., 2009) and thus re-
ﬂects the quality of the diet in terms of energy and diversity.
Non-food consumption is calculated from the value of items pur-
chased or acquired in the last month or three months for the following
17 items: personal care, home and kitchenware, communication (tele-
phone and internet), electricity and gas, transportation, water, housing
(rent and repairs), entertainment, beauty services, clothes and shoes for
adult males, clothes and shoes for adult females, clothes and shoes for
children, furniture and electronics, jewelry, toys, education, and tobac-
co.9 All values are converted to monthly per capita values. Total con-
sumption is constructed from a household's non-food and food
consumption.
3.2. Attrition and balance
The attrition rate of households from baseline to follow-up is 10%. If
attrition is correlated with treatment assignment, this could potentially
bias our impact estimates. The ﬁrst row in Table 1 shows no signiﬁcant
difference in attrition rates across intervention arms. Even across arms
with similar attrition rates, differential attrition could threaten the in-
ternal validity of the study. In particular, if households that leave the
treatment arms are poorer than households that leave the control
arm, then our treatment estimates will be biased because any change
in outcomes will be due to both treatment and differential attrition. In
order to examine if differential attrition threatens the internal validity
of the study, we compare baseline characteristics of households that
leave the study across each intervention arm. Table B.1 in the appendix
reveals that across 126 difference in means test for those who attrited,
only 3 are signiﬁcant at the 5% level. Those who left the food and cash
arm are signiﬁcantly younger than those who left the control arm;
and those who left the food arm are less likely than the voucher arm
to have a dirt ﬂoor. However, baseline analysis across treatment and
control arms for households that remained in the study (Table 1) re-
veals that differences in age and dirt ﬂoor are not signiﬁcant; therefore,
the bias due to the differential attrition of these variables is likely to be
very small. Even so, as a robustness check, we bound our estimates fol-
lowing Lee (2009).
To ensure that randomization was successful, we compare baseline
characteristics across treatment and control households (Table 1). We
conduct the analysis on the 2087 households that are in the baseline
and follow-up surveys and have complete data on food consumption.
We compare each treatment arm separately to the control arm and
each treatment arm to the other treatment arms.
Table 1 reveals that household heads in the control group have a
mean age of approximately 42 years, 32% have secondary schooling or
higher, 28% are married, 37% are Colombian, and slightly more than
one quarter are females. The average household size and total monthly
consumption per capita for the control arm is 4.12 and $111 respective-
ly. Although these households are poor, their daily per capita caloric in-
take is high, at 2021 kcal (or 2565 for adult equivalent caloric intake).
Using the average total monthly consumption across all arms of
$404.34, the transfer of $40 is approximately 10% of a household's9 Wedonot include health expenditures because thehealthmodulewas only applied to
households who reported a member being sick in the last four weeks. Consequently, 27%
of households at follow-uphavemissing health expenditures. As recommended byDeaton
and Zaidi (2002),we also exclude taxes and ceremonies because theyhappen infrequently
and often do not represent normal consumption patterns.
10 Stratiﬁcation occurred in the two provinces of Sucumbíos and Carchi.
Table 1
Baseline mean characteristics by intervention arms.
Means P-value of difference
N Control Food Cash Voucher Food -Control Cash -Control Voucher -Control Food -Cash Food -Voucher Cash -Voucher
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
Attrition Rates 2357 0.11 0.08 0.09 0.11 0.11 0.34 0.80 0.43 0.18 0.49
Household head characteristics
Female 2087 0.26 0.25 0.28 0.29 0.96 0.49 0.37 0.48 0.37 0.87
Colombian 2087 0.37 0.28 0.24 0.26 0.22 0.05 0.08 0.57 0.76 0.71
Married 2087 0.28 0.30 0.28 0.27 0.59 0.89 0.65 0.50 0.33 0.74
Age (years) 2087 41.71 41.13 41.42 42.21 0.57 0.80 0.68 0.80 0.36 0.55
Has secondary education or higher 2087 0.32 0.35 0.35 0.38 0.49 0.54 0.21 0.92 0.63 0.54
Household characteristics
Number of children 0-5 years 2087 0.59 0.66 0.59 0.62 0.25 0.95 0.58 0.28 0.56 0.62
Number of children 6-15 years 2087 1.02 0.90 0.89 0.83 0.21 0.12 0.01 0.91 0.44 0.45
Household size 2087 4.12 3.91 3.82 3.75 0.17 0.03 0.01 0.57 0.33 0.64
Floor type: dirt 2087 0.06 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.51 0.24 0.57 0.61 0.91 0.50
Owns television 2087 0.81 0.82 0.79 0.82 0.93 0.46 0.77 0.39 0.83 0.24
Owns computer 2087 0.27 0.32 0.29 0.29 0.28 0.56 0.54 0.54 0.53 1.00
Owns mobile phone 2087 0.85 0.80 0.82 0.84 0.11 0.25 0.63 0.61 0.25 0.50
Owns Car/truck/motorcycle 2087 0.24 0.22 0.24 0.24 0.47 0.81 0.99 0.58 0.43 0.77
Owns land 2087 0.13 0.12 0.12 0.13 0.78 0.74 0.80 0.95 0.65 0.57
Outcome variables
Dietary diversity index 2087 17.02 17.44 17.41 17.28 0.53 0.51 0.64 0.95 0.77 0.77
Household dietary diversity score 2087 9.11 9.22 9.23 9.19 0.57 0.49 0.61 0.95 0.87 0.78
Food consumption score 2087 59.05 60.93 60.00 59.75 0.35 0.57 0.66 0.63 0.52 0.86
Total per capita consumption
(monthly)
2087 111.03 110.46 111.02 114.35 0.93 1.00 0.59 0.94 0.55 0.58
Non-food per capita consumption
(monthly)
2087 65.65 63.50 62.60 65.11 0.68 0.55 0.91 0.86 0.74 0.59
Food per capita consumption
(monthly)
2087 45.38 46.96 48.42 49.23 0.63 0.26 0.15 0.64 0.47 0.75
Caloric intake per capita (daily) 2087 2021.38 1803.24 1922.36 1813.00 0.26 0.60 0.25 0.25 0.92 0.17
P-value from joint F-test 0.87 0.63 0.68
Columns 2-5 report baseline means by intervention arm for household in the study analysis. Columns 6-11 report p-values from tests on the equality of means for each variable. Standard
errors are clustered at the cluster level. F-tests of joint signiﬁcance: test of joint signiﬁcance in regression of respective treatment dummies on 20 baseline variables.
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tests between the treatment and control groups, only four are statisti-
cally different at the 5% level, which reveals that randomization was,
for the most part, effective at balancing baseline characteristics. While
with 132 tests, the probability that we will reject a true null
hypothesis for at least one outcome is nearly 100% (Duﬂo et al., 2007),
as a robustness we rerun all our speciﬁcations controlling for these
baseline covariates.
3.3. Graphical analysis
Fig. 1 shows the densities at baseline and follow-up of two out-
come indicators: 1) the log value of per capita food consumption,
and 2) the FCS. At baseline there are no large differences between
the pooled treatment and control arms for either indicator. However,
at follow-up the density for the pooled treatment group has shifted
more to the right causing a larger difference between the treatment
and control groups. Our estimation strategy explained in more detail
below captures these differences of the treatment group compared
to the control group.
4. Methods
Our estimation strategy relies on the randomized design of the
transfer program. Random assignment of clusters assures that, on aver-
age, households will have similar baseline characteristics across treat-
ment and control arms, as demonstrated in the previous section. Such
a design eliminates systematic differences between beneﬁciaries and
non-beneﬁciaries andminimizes the risk of bias in the impact estimatesdue to “selection effects”. Moreover, we take advantage of the baseline
survey and estimate the treatment effect using Analysis of Covariance
(ANCOVA) which controls for the lagged outcome variable. Given the
high variability and low autocorrelation of our food consumption data,
ANCOVA estimates are preferred over difference-in-difference esti-
mates (McKenzie, 2012). The ANCOVA model that we estimate is the
following:
Yhj1 ¼ ∝þ β f foodj þ βccashj þ βvvoucher j þ γYhj0 þ δPhj þ μ j þ εhj
where Yhj1 is the outcome of interest for household h from cluster j at
follow-up and Yhj0 is the outcome of interest at baseline. foodj, cashj,
and voucherj are indicators that equal one if cluster j is in the corre-
sponding treatment arm. βf, βc, and βv represent the intent-to-treat es-
timators, or the effect of being assigned to the speciﬁc treatment arm. Phj
is an indicator for the level of stratiﬁcation or province and equals one if
a household resides in Sucumbíos at baseline.10μj and εhj are iid errors
across clusters and across households within clusters. To test whether
the intent to treat estimators are statistically different across treatment
arms, we conduct Wald tests of equality and report the p-values. In all
regressions we cluster the standard errors at the level of randomization
that is the cluster.
Given the relative success of random assignment, the inclusion of
baseline controls is not necessary to obtain unbiased estimates of β.
Thus in our main estimates we do not control for other baseline covar-
iates. However, as robustness we present the same results with
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Fig. 1. Kernel density plots of food security outcomes, by treatment and control group at baseline and follow-up.
11 It is worth noting that the average number of days since beneﬁciary's last transfer is
approximately 16 days. Although transfers are expected to last a month, there could be
differences across arms in how quickly transfers are consumed. We explore this further
in Section 6.
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iables include: an indicator forwhether household head is female, an in-
dicator for whether household head is Colombian, an indicator for
whether household head has at least some secondary education, house-
hold head's age, number of children 0–5 years old, number of children
6–15 years old, and household wealth quintiles (ﬁve indicators for
each quintile). The household wealth quintiles are constructed from a
wealth index that is created using the ﬁrst principal from a principal
components analysis (PCA). Variables used to construct the index are
housing infrastructure indicators (e.g., type of ﬂoor, roof, toilet, light,
fuel, andwater source) and 11 asset indicators (e.g., refrigerator, mobile
phone, TV, car, and computer).
5. Results
5.1. Food and non-food consumption
We begin our analysis by comparing the impact of treatment on the
value of food, non-food, and total consumption (Table 2). The outcomes
of interest are in monthly per capita terms. The ﬁrst three columns of
Table 2 reveal the impact in levels, and the last three reveal the impact
in percent changes or log values.
All three treatment arms signiﬁcantly improve a household's food
consumption and total consumption. Being in the program signiﬁcantly
increases the value of a household's per capita food consumption by
$5.47-$9.22 depending on the treatment arm (column 1). The size of
the impact is not signiﬁcantly different across arms, which implies
that the amount of the transfer being used on food consumption is the
same across transfermodalities. Similar to results on food consumption,
all three arms signiﬁcantly increase the value of non-food and total percapita consumption by $6.78-$9.22 and $12.66-$18.50 respectively, and
the size of the impact is not signiﬁcantly different across arms (columns
2 and 3).
Given that consumption data is highly skewed, our preferred esti-
mates are the log estimates from columns 4-6. These estimates reafﬁrm
the previous results and reveal that all three arms signiﬁcantly increase
the value of food and total consumption, and food and vouchers signif-
icantly increase the value of non-food consumption. The difference in
the size of the impact across treatment arms is never signiﬁcant,
which reveals that the three transfers lead to similar spending patterns
on food and non-food items. The increase in per capita food consump-
tion ranges from 14% for the cash group to 20% for the food group, or
an increase of $6.66-$9.51.11 The increase in total per capita consump-
tion ranges from 11% for the cash group to 17% for the food group, or
an increase of $12.30-$19.01.
5.2. Caloric intake and dietary diversity
Although the impact on the value of food consumption is similar
across treatment arms, the types of food being bought may differ, and
in particular food consumption patternsmay differwith respect to ener-
gy value and dietary diversity. Table 3 reveals that all three treatment
arms signiﬁcantly improve both households' caloric intake and dietary
diversity, however, differences across treatment arms begin to emerge.
For example, food leads to a 21% increase in caloric intake while cash
Table 2
Impact of treatment arms on food and non-food consumption.
LEVELS LOGS
Food consumption
(per capita)
Non-food consumption
(per capita)
Total consumption
(per capita)
Food consumption
(per capita)
Non-food consumption
(per capita)
Total consumption
(per capita)
Food treatment 9.22 9.22 18.50 0.20 0.15 0.17
(2.79)*** (3.30)*** (5.02)*** (0.04)*** (0.07)** (0.05)***
Cash treatment 5.47 6.81 12.66 0.14 0.07 0.11
(2.56)** (3.93)* (5.09)** (0.04)*** (0.06) (0.04)***
Voucher treatment 6.38 6.78 13.45 0.15 0.13 0.13
(2.58)** (2.82)** (4.38)*** (0.04)*** (0.06)** (0.04)***
R2 0.21 0.17 0.22 0.26 0.25 0.25
N 2087 2087 2087 2087 2087 2087
Baseline Mean 47.54 64.29 111.83 . . .
P-value: Food = Voucher 0.31 0.46 0.33 0.23 0.75 0.40
P-value: Cash = Voucher 0.73 0.99 0.88 0.80 0.35 0.63
P-value: Food = Cash 0.17 0.57 0.30 0.14 0.27 0.21
Standard errors in parenthesis clustered at the cluster level. * p b 0.1 ** p b 0.05 *** p b 0.01.
All estimations control for baseline outcome variable and province.
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niﬁcant at the 5% level.
While caloric intake plays an important role in meeting households'
food security needs, a more varied diet is important for improving
health outcomes. In contrast to the results on caloric intake, food leads
to signiﬁcantly smaller impacts than vouchers on dietary diversity as
measured by the DDI and FCS. Cash also leads to signiﬁcantly smaller
impacts than vouchers on the FCS. While the impact of cash and food
on the FCS is 6.57 and 6.96 points respectively (or an 11 and 12% in-
crease), the impact of vouchers is 9.56 (or a 16% increase). The last col-
umn in Table 3 estimates the impact of transfers on the percentage of
households with poor to borderline food consumption as measured by
the FCS. Even though all three modalities signiﬁcantly increase the
FCS, only vouchers and food signiﬁcantly decrease the percentage of
households with poor to borderline food consumption scores, and the
size of the decrease is signiﬁcantly larger for the food arm when com-
pared with the cash arm.
5.3. Impact by food groups
In order to see what food items are driving the differences in caloric
intake and dietary diversity across arms, we disaggregate caloric intake
and the frequency of consumption by the 12 food groups that make up
the HDDS (Table 4). The top panel of Table 4 reports impacts on food
frequency – or number of days in the last week that a household con-
sumed the speciﬁc food group. The bottom panel, reports impacts onTable 3
Impact of treatment arms on food security outcomes.
Log caloric intake (per capita) HDDS
Food treatment 0.21 0.61
(0.04)*** (0.12)*
Cash treatment 0.12 0.47
(0.04)*** (0.11)*
Voucher treatment 0.18 0.60
(0.04)*** (0.12)*
R2 0.17 0.16
N 2087 2087
Baseline Mean 1895.43 9.18
P-value: Food = Voucher 0.40 0.86
P-value: Cash = Voucher 0.15 0.16
P-value: Food = Cash 0.03 0.12
Standard errors in parenthesis clustered at the cluster level. * p b 0.1 ** p b 0.05 *** p b 0.01. B
All estimations control for baseline outcome variable and province.daily per capita caloric intake for each food group. The last 4 columns
of Table 4, consists of the food groups included in the food transfer. Con-
sistentwith the composition of the food transfer, there are large and sig-
niﬁcant increases in the number of days households in the food group
consumed cereals, ﬁsh and seafood, and pulses and legumes. Signiﬁcant
increases are also found in thenumber of days the food group consumed
roots and tubers, fruits, meat and poultry, andmilk and diary, which im-
plies that these items are not substitutes for those in the food basket.
Cash also leads to signiﬁcant increases in 7 food groups: roots and tu-
bers, vegetables, meat and poultry, eggs, milk and dairy, ﬁsh and sea-
food, and pulses and legumes. On the other hand, vouchers lead to the
largest number of signiﬁcant increases in 9 out of the 12 food groups.
When compared to food transfers, vouchers lead to signiﬁcantly larger
increases in the frequency of consumption of vegetables, eggs, and
milk and dairy. When compared to cash transfers, vouchers lead to sig-
niﬁcantly larger increases in the frequency of consumption of ﬁsh and
seafood, and pulses and legumes.
Results on caloric intake follow a similar pattern. In particular food
leads to signiﬁcant increases in the caloric intake of the items that
make up the food transfer in addition to increases in roots and tubers,
vegetables, fruits, meat and poultry, and milk and dairy. Cash follows a
similar pattern as food, except that the increase in caloric intake from
food is signiﬁcantly larger for ﬁsh and seafood, and pulses and legumes.
When compared to vouchers, food also leads to signiﬁcantly larger in-
creases in calories from ﬁsh and seafood and from pulses and legumes.
These signiﬁcantly larger increases in items that make up the foodDDI FCS Poor food consumption
2.36 6.96 -0.05
** (0.44)*** (1.22)*** (0.02)***
2.64 6.57 -0.02
** (0.42)*** (1.29)*** (0.02)
3.13 9.56 -0.04
** (0.45)*** (1.39)*** (0.02)***
0.27 0.16 0.08
2087 2087 2087
17.27 59.86 0.11
0.07 0.07 0.73
0.22 0.05 0.13
0.48 0.77 0.09
aseline mean of log caloric intake reported in levels.
Table 5
Heterogeneous impact on caloric intake.
Log caloric intake
(per adult equiv.)
Log caloric intake
(per adult equiv.)
Food treatment 0.22 0.28
(0.04)*** (0.05)***
Cash treatment 0.12 0.12
(0.03)*** (0.05)**
Voucher treatment 0.17 0.19
(0.04)*** (0.05)***
Food X High caloric intake (kcals N 2100) -0.13
(0.06)**
Cash X High caloric intake (kcals N 2100) 0.01
(0.06)
Voucher X High caloric intake (kcals N 2100) -0.05
(0.06)
High caloric intake (kcals N 2100) 0.11
(0.05)**
Constant 5.44 5.75
(0.23)*** (0.33)***
N 2087 2087
Table 4
Impact of treatment arms on food frequency and caloric intake by food groups.
In-kind food items
Roots &
Tubers
Vegetables Fruits Meat &
poultry
Eggs Milk &
dairy
Sugar &
honey
Other Cereals Fish &
seafood
Pulses, legumes
& nuts
Oils &
fats
Panel A. Outcome variable: Number of days in the last week household consumed…
Food treatment 0.30 0.15 0.31 0.27 0.04 0.38 0.06 -0.19 0.36 0.77 1.22 0.04
(0.16)* (0.11) (0.16)* (0.09)*** (0.15) (0.17)** (0.08) (0.19) (0.10)*** (0.13)*** (0.15)*** (0.11)
Cash treatment 0.33 0.33 0.13 0.39 0.25 0.70 -0.04 0.05 0.07 0.25 0.58 -0.07
(0.17)** (0.10)*** (0.15) (0.11)*** (0.15)* (0.17)*** (0.09) (0.19) (0.10) (0.09)*** (0.12)*** (0.11)
Voucher treatment 0.48 0.40 0.28 0.35 0.47 0.98 -0.04 0.02 0.21 0.48 0.79 -0.10
(0.17)*** (0.10)*** (0.14)** (0.11)*** (0.14)*** (0.19)*** (0.09) (0.19) (0.10)** (0.09)*** (0.12)*** (0.11)
N 2087 2087 2087 2087 2087 2087 2087 2087 2087 2087 2087 2087
Baseline Mean 5.15 6.07 4.50 1.91 3.65 2.92 6.45 4.41 6.22 0.85 1.53 0.40
P-value: Food = Voucher 0.35 0.02 0.88 0.41 0.01 0.00 0.17 0.30 0.09 0.03 0.01 0.16
P-value: Cash = Voucher 0.43 0.44 0.34 0.75 0.19 0.16 0.98 0.87 0.13 0.01 0.09 0.73
P-value: Food = Cash 0.87 0.11 0.32 0.25 0.23 0.07 0.18 0.21 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.28
Panel B. Outcome variable: Log per capita caloric intake (daily)…
Food treatment 0.24 0.20 0.24 0.37 0.09 0.51 0.05 0.13 0.22 1.29 0.90 0.16
(0.12)** (0.07)*** (0.11)** (0.11)*** (0.09) (0.16)*** (0.06) (0.10) (0.05)*** (0.17)*** (0.15)*** (0.10)
Cash treatment 0.19 0.24 0.16 0.46 0.06 0.68 0.05 0.06 0.16 0.49 0.44 0.06
(0.10)* (0.07)*** (0.10) (0.12)*** (0.08) (0.13)*** (0.06) (0.10) (0.06)*** (0.14)*** (0.13)*** (0.09)
Voucher treatment 0.16 0.24 0.21 0.42 0.19 0.89 0.09 0.04 0.17 0.57 0.63 0.07
(0.10) (0.07)*** (0.10)** (0.11)*** (0.09)** (0.15)*** (0.06) (0.10) (0.06)*** (0.12)*** (0.13)*** (0.09)
N 2087 2087 2087 2087 2087 2087 2087 2087 2087 2087 2087 2087
Baseline Mean 146.31 29.53 198.52 142.76 37.33 102.50 317.73 24.21 818.46 22.20 49.16 6.72
P-value: Food = Voucher 0.46 0.53 0.72 0.66 0.30 0.01 0.47 0.35 0.32 0.00 0.04 0.32
P-value: Cash = Voucher 0.75 0.95 0.56 0.75 0.15 0.10 0.52 0.83 0.74 0.41 0.11 0.94
P-value: Food = Cash 0.63 0.50 0.39 0.45 0.81 0.22 0.94 0.45 0.15 0.00 0.00 0.31
Standard errors in parenthesis clustered at the cluster level. * p b 0.1 ** p b 0.05 *** p b 0.01. Baseline means of log per capita caloric intake reported in levels.
All estimations control for baseline outcome variable and province.
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items were extramarginal.
6. Extensions and robustness checks
6.1. Heterogeneity by energy deﬁcient households
One concern for policymakers is that transfers, and especially the
food modality, are increasing the energy consumption of a population
that is not deﬁcient in energy at baseline. A similar study in Mexico
found that cash and food not only led to increases in energy consump-
tion, but also increases in women's weight with the greatest impact
occurring in already obesewomen (Leroy et al., 2010, 2013). To investi-
gatewhether larger increases in calories occur for thosewho are not en-
ergy deﬁcient at baseline, we create interaction terms of each treatment
arm with an indicator that equals one if a household consumes more
than 2100 adult equivalent kcals a day.12 Thus the coefﬁcients on the
treatment arms represent the impact for households not consuming
more than 2100 kcals a day and the interaction terms represent the dif-
ferential effect with respect to consuming more than 2100 kcals. Given
that we are using an adult equivalent cutoff, we estimate the impact on
adult equivalent outcomes instead of per capita outcomes. The ﬁrst col-
umn in Table 5 reveals the average impact of the treatment arms on
adult equivalent caloric intake, and the second column reveals the het-
erogeneous impacts with respect to being above the cutoff. Similar to
the per capita outcomes in Table 3, the average treatment effects on ca-
loric intake across all arms are large and signiﬁcant. The treatment effect
of food is signiﬁcantly larger for households not consuming more than
2100 adult equivalent kcals a day than for households consuming12 2,100 is the recommendedkilocalories per day forwoman18-30 yearswithmoderate
activity. 2150 is the recommended kilocalories per day for woman 30-60 yearswithmod-
erate activity (Smith and Subandoro, 2007). Our results are robust to either cutoff.more than 2100 adult equivalent kcals a day. For households not con-
suming 2100 kcals, the impact across arms is signiﬁcantly larger for
food than cash and vouchers. Although the differential effect is signiﬁ-
cant for the food arm, the impact on caloric intake for households re-
ceiving more than 2100 kcals a day is still large (15% increase) and
signiﬁcant. In contrast to the food arm, the differential effect is not sig-
niﬁcant for the cash or voucher arms.P-value: Food = Voucher 0.22 0.09
P-value: Cash = Voucher 0.15 0.09
P-value: Food = Cash 0.01 0.00
Standard errors in parenthesis clustered at the cluster level. * p b 0.1 ** p b 0.05
*** p b 0.01.
All estimations control for baseline outcome variable and province.
Table 6
Modality speciﬁc cost of improving outcomes by 15%.
Food Cash Voucher
Value of food consumption $8.60 $3.20 $3.27
Caloric intake $8.19 $3.74 $2.73
HDDS $24.56 $8.97 $7.01
DDI $12.28 $2.99 $2.73
FCS $14.33 $4.08 $3.07
Modality speciﬁc costs per transfer are used to calculate the cost of increasing each
outcome by 15%.
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Although treatment was not signiﬁcantly associated with attrition
from baseline to follow-up (Table 1) and those who attrited across
control and treatment arms are similar on observable characteristics
(Appendix Table B.1), attrition may be correlated with unobserved
heterogeneity in the outcome variables. To address issues of non-
random sample selection, we bound our treatment estimates follow-
ing Lee (2009). The idea behind Lee bounds is to construct worst case
scenarios by assuming those households who select into the sample
because of treatment (marginal households) are at the very top or
very bottom of the outcome distribution. Thus trimming the upper
and lower tails of the outcome distribution by the proportion of mar-
ginal households yields bounds on the treatment effects. In other
words, we trim the outcome distribution of each treatment arm by
the difference in the proportion of non-missing observations be-
tween the treatment and control arm, over the proportion of non-
missing observations of the treatment arm. Appendix Tables B.2 and
B.3 reveal tight bounds on the treatment estimates, which is not sur-
prising given that the difference in non-missing observations between
the treatment and control arms is quite small. Moreover, Tables B.2
and B.3 reveal that even the lower bound estimates, show large and
signiﬁcant impacts across all treatment arms on the quantity and qual-
ity of food consumed.
We also address issues of outliers, typical in consumption data, and
the few imbalances across baseline characteristics, by checkingwhether
our results are robust to adding control variables and to winsorizing the
tails – or converting the bottom 1% of observations to the 1% value and
the top 1% of observations to the 99% value (Appendix Tables B.4 and
B.5). We do not estimate winsorized values for the HDDS outcome be-
cause it does not contain large tails (it ranges from 1-12 with a large
number of observations at both 1 and 12). Results reveal that adding co-
variates and winsorizing slightly changes the coefﬁcients on treatment,
however, general conclusions remain the same. In particular, all treat-
ment arms improve the quantity and quality of food consumed, howev-
er, food leads to larger increases in calories and vouchers lead to larger
increases in dietary diversity.
6.3. Cash conundrum
Appendix Table B. 4 reveals that differences between cash and food
on the value of food consumption have become slightly more pro-
nounced. The consistently smaller impact of cash on the value of con-
sumption, leads to questioning why this occurs. One potential
explanation is that there could be differences across transfers in how
quickly or slowly transfers are consumed, and if cash is consumed
more quickly and thus not captured in the 7 day food consumption
recall, thenwemay be underestimating the impact of cash.We take ad-
vantage of the variation in the timingofwhen the surveywas conducted
to investigatewhether length of time since the last transfer led to differ-
ential impacts on food security and whether this varied by treatment
arm. For logistical reasons, the survey was ﬁrst administered in
Sucumbíos and then Carchi, consequently 98% of beneﬁciaries in
Sucumbíos were surveyed 3-17 days after their last transfer and 99%
of beneﬁciaries in Carchi were surveyed 18-30 days after their last
transfer. As a result, we divide our sample by province and create differ-
ent indicators across provinces for length of time since transfer. In
Sucumbíos, we create an indicator that equals one if time since last
transfer is greater than a week (70% of beneﬁciaries in Sucumbíos
were surveyed more than one week after the transfer) and for Carchi
we create an indicator that equals one if time since last transfer is great-
er than 3 weeks (75% of beneﬁciaries in Carchi were surveyed more
than 3 week after the transfer). With the exception of food transfers
in Carchi, results indicate that there are no differential impacts with re-
spect to the timing since the last transfer (Appendix Table B.6). This is
not surprising given that all three transfer modalities were expectedto last a month and 98.5% of households were surveyed within a
month of being treated.
Another possible explanation is that cash households self-report
saving a signiﬁcant amount of their transfer. While we did not collect
detailed data on savings, the few questions we have on bank ac-
counts and savings, shows no evidence of increased savings in the
cash arm or any other arm (results available upon request). Cash
and food households also self-report sharing their transfers, and
again we ﬁnd little evidence in our data that households are sharing
transfers with others outside the household (results available upon
request). Instead of making transfers to others outside the house-
hold, cash could be crowding out other forms of transfers into the
household. In Mexico and South Africa, public transfer programs
have been found to crowd out private transfers (Albarran and
Attanasio, 2003; Jensen, 2004) which is consistent with models of
altruism and perfect and imperfect risk sharing. We do ﬁnd evidence
for this hypothesis, and in particular, cash households are signiﬁ-
cantly less likely than control households to take out a loan or
borrow money from family or institutions (Appendix Table B.7).
The same is not true for food and voucher households. The decrease
in the amount of money coming into cash households from loans is
28% or $52 over a 6 month period. This translates to a monthly per
capita value of approximately $2.20, which may account for some
of the smaller impact of cash on consumption. Voucher households
also experience crowding out and in particular they experience a signif-
icant decrease in the probability and value of food transfers in the form
of gifts and informal sharing from friends and family outside the house-
hold. However, the decrease in value is very small and translates to a per
capita monthly value of $0.11.
7. Costing
We collected detailed information on the costs of implementing the
three modalities using an ABC-I (Activity-based Costing – Ingredients)
method. The ABC-I method combines activity-based accounting
methods with the “ingredients” method whereby program costs
are obtained from inputs, input quantities, and input unit costs
(Edejer et al., 2003; Fiedler et al., 2008). An advantage of the detailed
information on costs obtained fromWFP's accounting ledgers and in-
terviews is that costs that are common across modalities can be sep-
arated from those that are modality speciﬁc. For example, the cost of
obtaining data needed to implement the proxymeans test is a common
cost – it is independent of the type of transfer a household received. In
contrast, the cost of manufacturing debit cards used by cash beneﬁcia-
ries is speciﬁc to the cash transfer modality. A second strength of
these cost data is that we can calculate the staff costs associated with
this intervention. Again, some staff costs, such as those associated
with project launch, are common across all modalities. Likewise, other
staff costs are modality speciﬁc, such as time spent identifying super-
markets willing to accept vouchers.
We are interested in the modality-speciﬁc costs of implementing
these transfers. Modality speciﬁc costs are those costs unique to
Table 7
Transfer preference, by treatment status.
Means P-value of difference
Food Cash Voucher Food -Cash Food -Voucher Cash -Voucher
If given the choice, beneﬁciary would prefer to receive
All of the transfer in its current modality 0.55 0.77 0.56 0.00 0.91 0.00
None of the transfer in its current modality 0.28 0.09 0.31 0.00 0.45 0.00
N 341 425 441
Sample consists of householdswhoparticipated in the program. First three columns report baselinemeans by intervention arm, last three columns report p-values from tests on the equal-
ity of means for each variable. Standard errors are clustered at the cluster level.
13 One main complaint from voucher recipients was that the supermarkets had higher
prices. While we do ﬁnd slightly higher prices on some items such as fruits or meats and
chicken, for other items such as cereals, pulses, and tubers, there are virtually no differ-
ences. There is also a possible quality difference, especially for fresh items, however, it is
also possible that these differences are due to perceptions of beneﬁciaries or reﬂections
of the types of goods they purchase in the supermarket.
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tation (planning costs, targeting, sensitization, nutrition training
and others) and the $40 cost of the actual transfer. Expressing
these costs in per-transfer terms, the cost to provide a food transfer
is $11.46; a cash transfer, $2.99; and a voucher, $3.27 (Appendix
Table B.8).
Breakdown of these modality-speciﬁc costs reveals information on
the amount of variable and ﬁxed costs, and human resource versus
physical resource costs (Appendix Table B.8). The cost of physical mate-
rials associated with vouchers, such as printing, is trivial. However, sig-
niﬁcant staff costs are associated with supermarket selection and
negotiation of contracts, and voucher reconciliation and payment.
These staff costs account for nearly 90% of the cost of implementing
the voucher component of the intervention. The principal cost associat-
ed with the cash transfer is the production of debit cards. The food
transfer is signiﬁcantly more expensive due to the cost of transport
to distribution sites and the rental of storage facilities. Re-
packaging bulk items for distribution is also costly, accounting for
approximately 30% of the cost of food distribution. Moreover, the
costs of food will not tend to decrease with economies of scale because
much of the modality speciﬁc costs are physical resource costs such as
transport and re-packaging.
In order to compare the cost-effectiveness across modalities, we
conduct a simulation whereby beneﬁciaries' outcomes increase by
15%. Speciﬁcally, we calculate the cost to achieve this goal using
food, cash and vouchers, conditional on the transfer size and
abstracting from costs common to all modalities. Given the different
metrics by which our outcomes are measured, we conduct simula-
tions for each outcome. For example, Table 3 indicates that cash
transfers increase the FCS by 6.57 points; an 11% increase. There-
fore, the modality speciﬁc cost of increasing FCS by 15% using cash
transfers is (15%/11%) x $2.99 which equals $4.08. Table 6 shows
the results of these calculations for each modality for the following
ﬁve outcomes: the value of per capita food consumption, per capita
caloric intake, HDDS, DDI and FCS. Across all outcomes, food is
always the most costly means of improving these outcomes by
15%. Second, vouchers are usually the least costly means of improv-
ing these outcomes by 15%, with the exception of one outcome, in-
creasing the value of food consumption, where vouchers and cash
have very similar costs.
This cost-effectiveness analysis assumes that the cost toWFP of pro-
curing foods is equal to their market value. Using data provided byWFP
on procurement costs, we are able to assess this assumption. The
canned ﬁsh, rice, lentils and oil provided to beneﬁciaries were largely
procured locally, although an additional portion of the vegetable oil
and lentils were obtained through international procurement. External
shipping and human resource related pipeline costs are included for
those commodities procured internationally, while in-country transport
is included for locally procured commodities. Using these data, we
ﬁnd that it cost WFP $46.76 to procure a $40 ration. When the
modality-speciﬁc costs of each program type are combined with the
cost of transfers inclusive of food procurement cost, we ﬁnd that it is
considerably less expensive to provide cash ($42.99 per transfer) orvouchers ($43.27 per transfer) than food ($58.22 per transfer). While
the cost to WFP of procuring food may vary according to a host of
factors, we ﬁnd that in this case food is more expensive to procure
and to deliver to program beneﬁciaries.
8. Beneﬁciaries' preferences and costs
Other factors to take into account when assessing whether cash or
in-kind transfers should be provided relates to beneﬁciaries' costs
(time and money) associated with receiving payments and beneﬁ-
ciaries' preferences. Beneﬁciaries are asked how they would like to
receive transfers in the future. Table 7 shows that 55% of food bene-
ﬁciaries prefer to receive transfers entirely in food, 77% of cash ben-
eﬁciaries prefer to receive transfers entirely in cash and 56% of
voucher beneﬁciaries prefer to receive transfers entirely as vouchers.
While these numbers suggest widespread satisfaction with these
transfer modalities, they may be subject to bias toward the modality
that beneﬁciaries receive. More interesting are the proportions of
those who having received one form of transfer do not wish to re-
ceive the same form in the future if faced with other options. Only
9% of cash beneﬁciaries do not wish to receive further transfers in
the form of cash. In contrast, 28% of food beneﬁciaries do not wish
to receive further transfers in the form of food and 31% of voucher
beneﬁciaries do not wish to receive further transfers in vouchers.13
This is consistent with arguments in favor of cash over other transfer
modalities in that beneﬁciaries appear to appreciate the autonomy
that comes with cash.
In terms of costs to beneﬁciaries, cash and voucher recipients spend
an average of $1.46 and $1.65 per month respectively on transportation
and other out-of-pocket expenses to retrieve transfers. Food recipients
spend slightly more, $2.12, as many had to use taxis to carry home
the heavy loads of food given at the distribution points. In terms of
opportunity costs from time spent traveling to the distribution
point and waiting to receive their transfers, cash recipients spend
45 min traveling and waiting while food and voucher beneﬁciaries
spend on average 93 and 92 min, respectively. Consistent with ben-
eﬁciaries' preferences, overall cash recipients incur the least costs in
terms of time and money.
9. Conclusion
The debate over themerits of food assistance and the form this assis-
tance should take has a long history in economics. Despite this enduring
debate, little rigorous evidence exists that compares food assistance
in the form of cash versus in-kind. This paper uses a randomized
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vouchers, and food transfers. We ﬁnd that all three treatment arms
signiﬁcantly improve the quantity and quality of food consumed as
measured by the value of per capita food consumption, per capita ca-
loric intake, and dietary diversity measures - HDDS, DDI and FCS.
Across treatment arms we ﬁnd no differences in the amount of the
transfer that is used on food and non-food consumption. However,
we do ﬁnd signiﬁcant differences in the types of food consumed. In
particular, food leads to a signiﬁcantly higher increase in calories
and vouchers lead to signiﬁcantly larger improvements in dietary
diversity.
Whenwedecompose food consumption into food groups, underlying
patterns explaining these differences emerge. The larger increase in cal-
ories from the food arm is mainly due to signiﬁcantly larger increases
in consumption of ﬁsh and seafood, and pulses and legumes. The larger
increase in dietary diversity from the voucher arm ismainly due to signif-
icantly larger increases than the food arm in the number of days house-
holds consume vegetables, eggs, and milk and dairy and signiﬁcantly
larger increases than the cash arm in the number of days households
consume ﬁsh and seafood and pulses and legumes. These differences in
impacts across transfer modalities indicate that transfers of equivalent
value and frequency are used differently on food.While food transfers in-
crease food consumption, the increase is concentrated mainly on the
food items that make up the food transfer. Vouchers also increase food
consumption but are used onmore varied food items such as vegetables,
eggs, and milk and dairy. The difference in food consumption between
cash and vouchers is a littlemore subtle, andmost likely due to the limits
placed on vouchers towards nutritious food. Differences in prices and
types of food available at the supermarkets versus central markets may
be another reason for the differences in food consumption between
cash and voucher recipients. For example, the price of sardines and
tuna is cheaper ($4.04 versus $4.21) in supermarkets than central mar-
kets and this could explain the signiﬁcantly higher increase in frequency
of consumption of ﬁsh and seafood in the voucher arm.
Theory predicts that transfers of equal value that are infra-marginal
should have similar impacts on food consumption. Consistent with the-
oretical predictions, we ﬁnd that the transfer of $40/month which is
inframarginal with respect to the mean value of food consumption
had the same impact across arms on the value of food consumption.
This result is similar to Hoynes and Schanzenbach's (2009) ﬁndings
with the Food Stamp program in the United States, and to Cunha
(2012) ﬁndings with the PAL program in Mexico. Similar to Cunha's
ﬁndings, we also ﬁnd that the speciﬁc items that make up the food
transfer are extramarginal in that they lead to signiﬁcantly larger in-
creases in consumption of these items than cash. An important policy
question is whether these increases in consumption of certain items
from in-kind transfers are justiﬁed. In Ecuador's case, are larger in-
creases in consumption of cereals, pulses and legumes, and ﬁsh and sar-
dines justiﬁed over larger increases in consumption of milk and dairy in
the cash group or milk and dairy, eggs, and vegetables in the voucher
group? Preliminary indicators on dietary diversity suggest that they
are not; however, a more in-depth analysis of health indicators is need-
ed and left for future work.
It is important to emphasize that all three intervention arms re-
ceived identical nutrition education and were exposed to the same
messaging components as part of the transfer program. Although
we are not able to parse out the contribution of this education com-
ponent on overall impact, there is suggestive evidence that at least
part of the increase in food security is due to behavior change in-
duced by nutrition knowledge. In particular, we observe larger
shares of household's food consumption dedicated to dairy; pulses,
legumes and nuts; animal meat and eggs; and fruits and vegetables;
and smaller shares dedicated to starches and tubers, and oils and
fats. The contribution of the nutrition trainings on food security
has implications for external validity and program design for imple-
menters with similar objectives. Although nutrition messaging andtrainings are a common feature of many transfer programs, they
are often grouped into a multi-component program conditionality,
and are rarely isolated in impact evaluations as an experimental
component in themselves (Fiszbein et al., 2009). The general lack
of rigorous research on the role of education and training within
transfer programs points to the need for further studies speciﬁcally
designed to provide evidence.
Especially for policy makers, an important component of our analy-
sis is related to costs and the cost-effectiveness of implementing the
different transfer modalities. We ﬁnd that the modality speciﬁc cost
is $11.46 to provide a food transfer, $2.99 to provide a cash transfer
and $3.27 to provide a voucher. Given these costs and impacts, food
is the least cost-effective means of improving food consumption and
dietary diversity outcomes. However, the direct comparison of cash
versus vouchers is not as straightforward and ultimately depends on
the speciﬁc objectives of policy makers. If the objective is to increase
the value of food consumption, then there is not a difference between
cash or food vouchers. However, if the objective is to increase dietary
diversity or caloric intake, then vouchers are more cost-effective than
cash.
Although we ﬁnd that the food voucher is the most cost effective
modality across most indicators, this conclusion may not apply to
other settings. In particular, our ﬁndings are speciﬁc to urban popu-
lations with well-functioning markets and supermarkets. Our ﬁnd-
ings may not hold in areas where supermarkets do not have the
capacity to receive more clients, or where they do not have a consis-
tent supply of various food items. Moreover, the food energy con-
sumption of the targeted population is relatively high and not as
vulnerable to price or weather shocks. Thus, the way in which bene-
ﬁciaries spend the transfer may be different from that of populations
with low food energy consumption or populations whose food ener-
gy consumption is more vulnerable to weather shocks such as rural
farmers. For these populations, increasing and smoothing their
food consumption may be more of a priority than improving the di-
versity of their diet.
In the context considered here, choosing the “winner” among the
different modalities depends on the objectives of the policy makers. If
the objective of these transfers is simply to improve welfare, cash is
preferable. Cash is the modality that beneﬁciaries are most satisﬁed
with, and it is the cheapestmeans ofmaking transfers. Given the budget
available to WFP for this project, shifting from food to cash could have
increased the number of beneﬁciaries by 12%. If the objective is to
increase calories or dietary diversity, vouchers are the most cost-
effectivemeans of doing so, followed by cash. Although the vouchermo-
dality is the most cost-effective means of increasing caloric availability
and dietary quality, it is the modality least preferred by beneﬁciaries.
Thus policymakers are facedwith the tradeoff of improving overall wel-
fare or improving speciﬁc outcomes. The former gives aid recipients au-
tonomy while the latter restricts their choices in order to achieve
speciﬁc objectives.
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